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The Claim of Judicial Finality:
Theory Undercut by Experience
LOUIS FISHER*
ABSTRACT
Justices of the Supreme Court, legal scholars, and reporters who cover
judicial proceedings frequently claim that when the Court issues a
constitutional decision it remains final unless the Court changes its mind or
the Constitution is amended to reverse the Court. However, the record of more
than two centuries offers an entirely different picture. Decisions by the
Supreme Court lack finality on constitutional issues partly because the Court
makes mistakes and has done so throughout its history. Human institutions,
including the judiciary, are prone to miscalculation, including law, history,
and political developments. After the Court issues a constitutional decision it
does not deprive the elected branches from adopting policies directly contrary
to what the Court has announced. This article offers many examples to
demonstrate that constitutional interpretation is not centered entirely in the
Supreme Court. The process involves all three branches, the states, scholars,
and the general public. At times the Court recognizes the deficiency of an
earlier decision and overrules it. However, the sole-organ error in CurtissWright (1936) was not corrected by the Court until its decision in Zivotofsky
v. Kerry on June 8, 2015. On other occasions, the regular political process
offers constitutional interpretations that override the Court.
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INTRODUCTION

In a 1953 opinion, Justice Robert Jackson remarked, “[w]e are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”1
The sentence is surprising, coming from someone who, over the years,
demonstrated unusual sophistication in understanding the Supreme Court’s
role in democratic government. Clearly, the Court has never been infallible or
final, as Jackson fully understood when he wrote for the Court in 1943 to
reverse the Court’s 8-1 flag-salute decision issued three years earlier.2 Why
advance such a plainly inaccurate claim?
Judicial review does not mean judicial finality or judicial supremacy. It
was never the intent of the Framers to vest final or exclusive authority in the
Supreme Court on constitutional interpretation. The Court has never
functioned in that manner. As with other branches of government, the Court
1

Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953), superseded by statute,
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214.
2
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling Minersville
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)).
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has its highs and lows, contributing to individual rights and freedoms in some
cases while undermining them in others. It is fully capable of making errors.
Chief Justice Rehnquist put the matter crisply in 1993: “It is an unalterable fact
that our judicial system, like the human beings who administer it, is fallible.”3
This article analyzes Supreme Court decisions to underscore the Court’s
non-final role in deciding constitutional law. Reasons for the selections vary:
helping to trigger the Civil War (Dred Scott),4 a quick reversal because the
Court’s composition changed (the Legal Tender Cases),5 a Justice switches his
vote and we don’t know who or why (the 1895 Income Tax Cases),6 and
invoking divine ordinances to prevent women from practicing law (Bradwell
v. State).7 Other cases involve equal accommodation legislation,8 the separatebut-equal standard,9 “liberty of contract,”10 mandatory sterilization,11 childlabor legislation,12 misrepresenting John Marshall’s sole-organ speech
(Curtiss-Wright),13 the flag-salute cases,14 and the Japanese-American cases.15
Litigation after World War II includes the state-secrets Reynolds case,16 school
busing,17 the trimester framework for abortion,18 an unworkable federalism
model (National League of Cities),19 legislative vetoes,20 treating corporations
as persons,21 and campaign finance.22
The process of constitutional interpretation is not a judicial monopoly but
rather a broad and continuing dialogue. In an article published in 1998, Jack
3

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993).
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV.
5
Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 570 (1871).
6
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 157 U.S. 583 (1895), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend XVI.
7
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
8
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
9
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) .
10
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
11
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
12
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
13
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
14
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1943) (overruling
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)).
15
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83, 63 S. Ct. 1375, 1377, 87 L. Ed.
1774 (1943); Minoru Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115, 116 (1943); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944);
16
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
17
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
18
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19
Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) overruled by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
20
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
21
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
22
Id.
4
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Balkin and Sanford Levinson objected that the current study of constitutional
law “is too much centered on the opinions of the Supreme Court and lacks
comparative and historical perspective.”23 Faulting the study of constitutional
interpretation for its “worship of the Supreme Court and its
pronouncements,”24 they selected three decisions for judicial error: Lochner,25
Plessy,26 and Korematsu,27 while referring to Dred Scott as “infamous.”28 In
an article published in 1998, Richard Primus selected Dred Scott, Plessy, and
Lochner as so lacking in support that they rank as anticanon.29 Ian Bartrum’s
2009 study focused largely on Lochner.30
Jamal Greene in 2011 prepared an extensive analysis of the anticanon,
directing attention to Dred Scott, Plessy, Lochner, and Korematsu.31 Four
other cases he found “particularly poorly reasoned or morally challenged but .
. . not, as a descriptive matter, anticanonical.”32 Scholars have identified other
decisions as anticanon.33 Nominees to the Supreme Court are at times asked
by Senators to comment on cases that fall within the category of anticanon.34
The principle of judicial finality remains strongly held. In 2012, Jeffrey
Toobin remarked that a Supreme Court decision “interpreting the Constitution
can be overturned only by a new decision or by a constitutional amendment.”35
Tom Goldstein, who frequently argues cases before the Supreme Court, stated
in 2013 that when the Court “interprets the Constitution, that is the final word.
The President and Congress can’t overturn its decision. The only option is to

23

J. M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111
HARV. L. REV. 963, 964 (1998).
24
Id. at 965 n.8.
25
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
26
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of
Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954), supplemented sub nom.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
27
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
28
Balkin & Levinson, supra note 23, at 1021.
29
Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J.
243, 248, 256–57 (1998). Primus defines anticanon to mean “highly important but
normatively undesirable” court rulings that are “in some senses a mirror image of the
constitutional canon.” Id. at 244 n.10.
30
Ian Bartrum, The Constitutional Canon as Argumentative Metonymy, 18 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 327, 348 (2009).
31
Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 (2011).
32
Id. (discussing Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842); Giles v. Harris, 189
U.S. 475 (1903); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); and Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
33
Id. at 388–90 (collecting cases that scholars have described as anticanon)
34
Id. at 392–93, 398–99.
35
JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH: THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE AND THE SUPREME
COURT 194 (2012).
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amend the Constitution, which is basically impossible.”36 The cases analyzed
in this article demonstrate that, contrary to the principal of judicial finality, the
process of constitutional interpretation is much more fluid and non-final, and
draws guidance from the elected branches and the general public.
II. SELECTIONS BY CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES
Writing in 1936, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes analyzed three cases
to illustrate the capacity for judicial error. In generally praising the Supreme
Court, he recognized that it “has the inevitable failings of any human
institution.”37 He acknowledged that “in three noticeable instances the Court
has suffered severely from self-inflicted wounds” by deciding Dred Scott, the
Legal Tender Cases, and the Income Tax Cases.38
A. Dred Scott
In Dred Scott, the Supreme Court considered two principal issues: could a
black man sue in federal court, and did Congress possess authority to prohibit
slavery in the territories? James Buchanan, newly elected President, decided
to entrust those constitutional questions exclusively to the Court. His
inaugural address of March 4, 1857, regarded slavery as presenting “a judicial
question, which legitimately belongs to the Supreme Court of the United
States, before whom it is now pending, and will, it is understood be speedily
and finally settled. To their decision, in common with all good citizens, I shall
cheerfully submit, whatever this may be . . . .”39
Buchanan was correct that the decision would be speedy. The Court
released its opinion two days later.40 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Roger Taney held that Dred Scott as a black man was not a citizen of Missouri
within the meaning of the Constitution and was not entitled to sue in federal
court.41 For Taney, the “only matter in issue before the court, therefore, is
whether the descendants of such slaves, when they shall be emancipated, or
who are born of parents who had become free before their birth, are citizens of

36
Tom Goldstein, Power, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2013, 6:49 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/ 06/power [https://perma.cc/3YER-DJPZ].
37
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 45–
46 (1936).
38
Id. at 50.
39
MY FELLOW CITIZENS: THE INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1789–2009, 132 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & Fred L. Israel
eds., 2010).
40
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403 (1857).
41
Id. at 454.
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a State, in the sense in which the word citizen is used in the Constitution of the
United States.”42
Taney regarded blacks as “a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who
had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not,
yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such
as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant
them.”43 Moreover, Congress had no constitutional authority to prohibit
slavery in the territories.44 To Taney, the Constitution recognized “the right of
property of the master in a slave” and made “no distinction between that
description of property and other property owned by a citizen.”45
Although President Buchanan accurately anticipated the swiftness of the
Court’s ruling, he falsely predicted that the Court’s decision would render the
slavery issue “finally settled.”46 The Court’s decision helped precipitate a civil
war that left, out of a population of 30 million, more than 600,000 dead and
400,000 wounded.47 To Chief Justice Hughes, even assuming “the sincerity
of the judges who took this view, the grave injury that the Court sustained
through its decision has been universally recognized. Its action was a public
calamity.”48
Dred Scott, formally overturned by the Civil War Amendments, faced
political repudiation long before.49 In his inaugural address in 1861, Abraham
Lincoln denied that constitutional questions could be settled solely by the
Supreme Court.50 If government policy on “vital questions affecting the whole
people is to be irrevocably fixed” by the Court, “the people will have ceased
to be their own rulers.”51 In legislation enacted in 1862, Congress asserted its
independent constitutional authority by prohibiting slavery in the territories,
with or without the Court’s support.52 In that same year, Attorney General
Edward Bates released a legal opinion that shredded the reasoning of Dred
Scott.53 He concluded that men of color, if born in America, are citizens of the

42

Id. at 403.
Id. at 404–05.
44
Id. at 447–52.
45
Id. at 451.
46
MY FELLOW CITIZENS: THE INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES 1789–2009, supra note 39.
47
LOUIS FISHER & KATY J. HARRIGER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 790
(11th ed., 2016).
48
HUGHES, supra note 37, at 50.
49
U.S. CONST. amends. XII, XIV, XV.
50
MY FELLOW CITIZENS: THE INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES 1789–2009, supra note 39.
51
Id. at 146.
52
Abolition of Slavery Act (Territories), ch. 111, 12 Stat. 432 (1862).
53
10 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 382 (1862).
43
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United States.54
B. Legal Tender Cases
Chief Justice Hughes explained that in the years following Dred Scott the
Court “was still suffering from lack of a satisfactory measure of public
confidence.”55 Yet it chose, with the Legal Tender Cases in 1870–71, to act in
a manner that once again “brought the Court into disesteem.”56 In 1866,
Congress reduced the number of Justices “in order to deprive President
[Andrew] Johnson of the opportunity to make appointments.”57 After Ulysses
S. Grant became President, Congress increased the number of Justices to
nine.58 There were two vacancies on the Court when it decided the first legal
tender case, Hepburn v. Griswold.59 It involved a statute passed by Congress
during the Civil War, treating paper money as legal tender for discharging
prior debts.60 With a bench of seven Justices and three in dissent, the Court
held that the money (“greenbacks”) was unconstitutional.61 Four Justices in
the majority were Democrats; three dissenters were Republicans.62 In the
lower federal courts, almost every Democratic judge declared the statute
unconstitutional; nearly every Republican judge sustained it.63
The retirement of Justice Robert Grier and the congressional authorization
the previous year of a new Justice allowed President Grant to appoint two new
members.64 Grant had reason to believe that both nominees would support the
Legal Tender Act.65 William Strong, as a member of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, had already sustained the statute.66 Grant’s second choice,
Joseph P. Bradley, appeared to be no less sympathetic.67 Fifteen months after
the Legal Tender Act had been declared unconstitutional, the Court upheld it
5 to 4.68 Strong and Bradley joined the original three dissenters to form the
54

Id. at 413.
HUGHES, supra note 37, at 51.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 51–52.
59
Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
60
Legal Tender Act, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 345 (1862) (authorizing the issue and
redemption of United States notes for funding the floating debt of the United States).
61
Hepburn, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 626.
62
Charles Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley’s Appointment to the Supreme Court
and the Legal Tender Cases, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1131 (1941).
63
Id.
64
Sidney Ratner, Was the Supreme Court Packed by President Grant?, 50 POL.
SCI. Q. 343, 352 (1935).
65
Id. at 351–52.
66
Fairman, supra note 62, at 1128.
67
Id.
68
Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 570 (1871).
55

312

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 16, No. 2

majority.69 Chief Justice Hughes concluded: “From the standpoint of the effect
on public opinion, there can be no doubt that the reopening of the case was a
serious mistake and the overruling in such a short time, and by one vote, of the
previous decision shook popular respect for the Court.”70 The second decision
underscored that a constitutional decision depends not solely on conscientious,
careful reasoning by Justices trained in the law, but on political judgments in
Congress regarding the size of the Court and new appointments.
C. Income Tax Cases
Chief Justice Hughes’s third example of a judicial self-inflicted wound
involves two decisions in 1895 on the taxing power. Twenty-five years
following the Legal Tender Cases, after the Court “had recovered its prestige,
its action in the income tax cases gave occasion for a bitter assault.”71 A
unanimous Court in 1881 upheld a federal income tax passed in 1864 to
finance the Civil War.72 It did so by calling it an indirect tax, concluding that
direct taxes (requiring apportionment under Article I, Section 9) “are only
capitation taxes . . . and taxes on real estate.”73 Capitation taxes are also called
“head taxes” (applied to each person).74
In 1895, however, the Supreme Court held that a tax on rents or income of
real estate was a direct tax and violated the Constitution by not being
apportioned.75 On the question whether the income tax was a direct or indirect
tax, the Justices were evenly divided, 4 to 4.76 Upon rehearing, a 5-4 decision
invalidated the income tax, treating it as a direct tax to be apportioned on the
basis of population.77 Justice Howell Edmunds Jackson, who did not
participate in the first decision because of illness, voted in favor of the income
tax in the second case.78 All things being equal, that should have produced a
5-4 majority upholding the income tax. However, another Justice switched his
vote to build a majority against the income tax.79 Who he was, and why he
switched, was not disclosed.80 The razor-thin majority and sudden reversal

69

Id. See generally BRIAN MCGINTY, LINCOLN AND THE COURT 278–87 (2008)
(discussing the background of the Legal Tender Cases).
70
HUGHES, supra note 37, at 52.
71
Id. at 53.
72
Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1881).
73
Id. at 602.
74
1 CRAIG R. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: POWERS OF
GOVERNMENT 340 (9th ed., 2009).
75
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895).
76
Id. at 586.
77
Id. at 637.
78
HUGHES, supra note 37, at 54.
79
Id.
80
Id.
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undermined the reputation of the Court. Not until 1913 did Congress and the
states pass the Sixteenth Amendment to override the Court.81
III. EARLY CHECKS ON JUDICIAL FINALITY
It is instructive to review several cases in the nineteenth century that
illustrate why Supreme Court decisions on constitutional matters are not
necessarily final. Initially, some Justices were astounded to learn that a
Court’s constitutional decision could be reversed by the elected branches.82
But in time, the Court learned it was not the only voice empowered to interpret
the Constitution.
A. McCulloch v. Maryland
In 1819, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the U.S.
Bank.83 Writing for the majority in McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall seemed
to promote the doctrine of judicial supremacy. He said that if a constitutional
dispute must be decided, “by this tribunal alone can the decision be made. On
the supreme court of the United States has the constitution of our country
devolved this important duty.”84
He overstated the Court’s role. At issue in McCulloch was the decision of
the two elected branches to create such an institution.85 It was their discretion
to create or not. Whether or not the Court blessed their efforts, a future
Congress or President could make an independent decision about continuing
the Bank. If Congress decided against reauthorization, that decision was
closed and final. The Court had no part. If Congress reauthorized the Bank
and a President vetoed it, either on policy or constitutional grounds, the Bank
was invalidated unless Congress could muster sufficient votes for an override.
Those decisions by the elected branches could not be second-guessed or
controlled by the Court. McCulloch has been described as one of the “fixed
stars in our constitutional constellation.”86 No one doubts its importance, but
it did not establish judicial finality or supremacy.
Congress decided in 1832 to reauthorize the Bank. President Andrew
Jackson was urged to sign the bill because the Bank had been endorsed by
previous Congresses, Presidents, and the Supreme Court.87 Supposedly he was
duty bound to sign the bill. Instead, he issued a veto, considering “mere
81

U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
See infra Section III.B. (discussing the Wheeling Bridge Cases from 1852 to
1856 and the three dissents in the latter case).
83
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 436–37 (1819).
84
Id. at 401.
85
Id. at 401–02.
86
Greene, supra note 31, at 385.
87
FISHER & HARRIGER, supra note 47, at 24.
82
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precedent” a “dangerous source of authority,” and explaining that it “should
not be regarded as deciding questions of constitutional power except where the
acquiescence of the people and the States can be considered as well settled.”88
In reviewing the checkered history of the Bank, he noted that the elected
branches favored a national bank in 1791, decided against it in 1811 and 1815,
and returned their support in 1816.89 At the state level, legislative, executive,
and judicial opinions on the constitutionality of the Bank were mixed.90
Nothing in this record persuaded Jackson to sign the bill. Congress sustained
his veto.91
To Jackson, even if Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion on the Bank in 1819
“covered the whole ground of this act, it ought not to control the coordinate
authorities of this Government.”92 All three branches, he said, “must each for
itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution.”93 Each public official
takes an oath to support the Constitution “as he understands it, and not as it is
understood by others.”94 His veto message articulated the theory of coordinate
construction. It was as much the duty of the elected branches to decide the
constitutionality of legislation as the judiciary. The authority of the Supreme
Court “must not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the
Executive when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such
influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve.”95
The dispute over McCulloch applies to contemporary issues. The Supreme
Court in 1988 upheld the constitutionality of the independent counsel.96
Nothing in that decision prevented Presidents from vetoing reauthorizing bills
as an unconstitutional infringement of their control over the executive branch,
and nothing prevented Congress from deciding not to reauthorize the
independent counsel if it concluded that this office posed substantial concerns,
including constitutional. That is what happened in 1999 when Congress
declined to reauthorize the independent counsel.97
B. Wheeling Bridge Cases
Judicial and congressional actions in the 1850s underscore why the
Supreme Court need not have the final word on constitutional matters. In
88

3 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1144–
45 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897–1925).
89
Id. at 1145.
90
Id.
91
FISHER & HARRIGER, supra note 47, at 25–26.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696–97 (1998).
97
LOUIS FISHER, DEFENDING CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 83–85 (2011).
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1852, the Court decided that the height of the Wheeling Bridge over the Ohio
River, constructed under Virginia state law, constituted a “nuisance” because
the structure was so low it obstructed navigation.98 The Court appointed a
commissioner to determine the facts about the bridge.99 By measuring its
height, the water level, and the height of chimneys of approaching boats, the
Commissioner decided the bridge represented an obstruction over a navigable
stream.100 Judicial finality on a constitutional issue? Not at all.
The Court released its decision on February 6, 1852, and in amended form
in May.101 On August 12, the House of Representatives debated a bill to make
the Wheeling Bridge “a lawful structure.”102 A sponsor of this legislation
insisted that the “ultimate right” to decide the issue “was in Congress” pursuant
to its power to regulate interstate commerce and preserve the intercourse
between states.103 Some lawmakers disagreed. Representative Carlton B.
Curtis asked: “Should Congress sit as a court of errors and appeals over the
decision and adjudication of the Supreme Court of the United States, and
consider matters which, without a doubt, properly belonged to that tribunal,
and review them in a manner entirely unknown to law?”104
However, was the dispute one of law or fact? If the latter, the fact-finding
capacity of the legislative branch was certainly equal, if not superior, to the
judiciary. The Court had shifted the investigation to the Commissioner. Why
should his judgment control Congress? Senator George Edmund Badger
denied that Congress was seeking “some revising power over the adjudications
of the Supreme Court.”105 Congress was exercising “our legislative functions,
as the court discharged its judicial functions.”106
On this matter, the legislative process proved more informed, perceptive,
and insightful than the judicial system. The bill required vessels navigating
the Ohio River “to conform the elevation of their chimneys to the height of the
bridge, in the exercise of our undoubted right to regulate and control the
commerce of the river.”107 Rather than altering the bridge to accommodate
vessels, ships needed to adjust their height to the bridge. The Supreme Court
and its commissioner did not consider that option.108
98

Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518, 625 (1852).
Id. at 625.
100
Id. at 568–70.
101
Id. at 625.
102
CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 1st Sess. 2195 (1852).
103
Id. at 2195–96 (statement of Rep. Woodward).
104
Id. at 2240. Curtis’s full speech appears at 967–68. Other speeches on the
Wheeling Bridge appear at 967–68, 972–74, 974–77, 1037–41, 1041–44, 1044–47,
1047–49, 1065–68, 1068–71.
105
Id. at 2310.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
99
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Statutory language adopted on August 31, three months after the Court’s
amended decision, provided that bridges across the Ohio River “are hereby
declared to be lawful structures in their present position and elevation.”109 The
statute required vessels navigating the Ohio River to ensure that any pipes and
chimneys shall not “interfere with the elevation and construction of said
bridges.”110 The dispute returned to the Supreme Court, with Pennsylvania
insisting that the statute was “unconstitutional and void.”111 Writing for the
majority, Justice Samuel Nelson explained that the Court in 1852 regarded the
bridge as inconsistent with the authority of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce.112 However, the new statute removed that objection.113 Because
of the new statute, “the bridge is no longer an unlawful obstruction” and “it is
quite plain the decree of the court cannot be enforced.”114
Three dissenters strongly disagreed. Justice John McLean recalled that
Chief Justice Marshall said “that congress could do many things, but that it
could not alter a fact. This it has attempted to do in the above act.”115 McLean
seemed to argue that the Court could alter a fact but Congress could not. He
concluded that the new statute, “being the exercise of a judicial and an
appellate power,” was unconstitutional.116 Yet members of Congress regarded
their action as the exercise of legislative, not judicial, power.117 Justice Robert
Grier, in a second dissent, protested that the congressional action was
unprecedented and “of dangerous example.”118 A third dissent came from
Justice James Wayne, who regarded the congressional statute as
unconstitutional.119
The position of these dissenters has not prevailed. States lacking authority
over interstate commerce at one point can have their powers strengthened by
an act of Congress. As the Court noted in 1946, “whenever Congress’
judgment has been uttered affirmatively to contradict the Court’s previously
expressed view that specific action taken by the states in Congress’ silence was
forbidden by the commerce clause, this body has accommodated its previous
judgment to Congress’ expressed approval.”120 In 1985, the Court said that
when Congress “so chooses, state actions which it plainly authorizes are
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invulnerable to constitutional attack under the Commerce Clause.”121 A
concurrence in 1995 by Justices Kennedy and O’Connor conceded that “if we
invalidate a state law, Congress can in effect overturn our judgment.”122
C. State Control over Intoxicating Liquors
Another judicial-congressional dialogue occurred in 1890 when the
Supreme Court in Leisy v. Hardin ruled that Iowa’s prohibition of intoxicating
liquors from outside its borders could not apply to original packages or kegs.123
A firm in Illinois transported sealed kegs of beer to Keokuk, Iowa, where a
state official seized the property and took it into custody because Iowa
prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquors.124 The Court held that only after
the original package entered Iowa and was broken into smaller packages could
the state regulate the product.125 However, the Court added a caveat: the power
of Congress over interstate commerce necessarily trumped the power of a state
“unless placed there by congressional act.”126 States could not exclude
incoming articles “without congressional permission.”127
The final word on this constitutional question therefore belonged to
Congress. The Court issued its opinion on April 28, 1890.128 By May 14, the
Senate reported a bill to grant Iowa authority to regulate incoming intoxicating
liquors.129 Imaginative entrepreneurs had responded to the Court’s decision
by opening up “original-package saloons” to block the state from exercising
any control.130 Brewers and distillers from outside the state began packaging
their goods “even in the shape of a vial containing a single drink.” 131
Congressional debate demonstrated the limitations of abstract Court doctrines
(“original package”) that proved unworkable in practice.132 Congress was
better informed than the Court.
Lawmakers offered irreverent remarks about the Court’s capacity to
exclusively decide this constitutional question. Senator George Edmunds
described the Court as “an independent and co-ordinate branch of the
Government” empowered to decide cases, but “as it regards the Congress of
121
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the United States, its opinions are of no more value to us than ours are to it.
We are just as independent of the Supreme Court of the United States as it is
of us, and every judge will admit it.”133 If members of Congress concluded
that the Court made an error with its constitutional reasoning, “are we to stop
and say that is the end of the law and the mission of civilization in the United
States for that reason? I take it not.”134
Congress enacted remedial legislation on August 6, 1890, slightly more
than three months after the Court’s decision.135 The statute made intoxicating
liquors, upon their arrival in a state or territory, subject to the police powers of
a state “to the same extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or
liquors had been produced in such State or Territory, and shall not be exempt
therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or
otherwise.”136 When the constitutionality of this statute reached the Supreme
Court a year later, it was upheld unanimously.137
IV. OTHER NINETEENTH-CENTURY LESSONS
Several decisions by the Supreme Court after the Civil War damaged its
reputation as guardian of personal rights. Individuals seeking protection from
the courts lost on a regular basis. Gradually they learned, as with women
seeking to practice law, that their interests were better defended by legislative
bodies at both the state and national level.
A. Bradwell v. Illinois
After the Civil War, women began to study medicine and law and pursue
other professional activities formerly dominated by men.138 As explained in
the next Section, repeatedly they found legal support from legislative bodies,
not from courts. William Blackstone’s doctrine of “coverture” placed women
in a subordinate status, making husband and wife “one person in law: that is,
the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband;
under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything.”139
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After studying law, Myra Bradwell applied for admission to the Illinois
bar in 1869.140 She needed the approval of an all-male panel of judges to
practice in the state.141 They rejected her application solely on the ground that
she was a married woman.142 Her appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois
failed.143 Of her qualifications the court said “we have no doubt.”144 British
law and custom weighed heavily in the court’s analysis. Female attorneys
“were unknown in England,” and the suggestion that a woman could enter the
courts as a barrister would have created “hardly less astonishment” than if she
were elected to the House of Commons.145
The Illinois court identified even higher authority: “That God designed the
sexes to occupy different spheres of action, and that it belonged to men to
make, apply and execute the laws, was regarded as an almost axiomatic
truth.”146 The Illinois court advised that if change was needed, “let it be made
by that department of the government to which the constitution has entrusted
the power of changing the laws.”147 Bradwell took the judicial hint and sought
assistance from the Illinois legislature, which in 1872 passed a bill stating that
no person “shall be precluded or debarred from any occupation, profession or
employment (except military) on account of sex.”148
Bradwell brought the issue to the U.S. Supreme Court, hoping to establish
a national right for women to practice law under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.149 In a brief opinion, the Court denied
that the right of women to practice law in the courts was a privilege belonging
to citizens of the United States.150 A concurrence by Justice Bradley insisted
that man “is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender.”151 The “natural
and proper timidity and delicacy” of women made them “unfit” for many
occupations.152 A “divine ordinance” commanded that a woman’s primary
mission in life is to the home.153 While many women did not marry, a general
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rule imposed upon females the “paramount destiny and mission” to fulfill the
roles of wife and mother.154 To Bradley: “This is the law of the Creator.”155
Considering Bradwell’s success with the Illinois legislature, could women
turn to Congress for support in their efforts to practice law? Several years after
the Bradwell case, Belva Lockwood drafted language and worked closely with
members of Congress to overturn the Court’s rule prohibiting women from
practicing there.156 Her bill in 1878 provided that when any woman had been
admitted to the bar of the highest court of a state, or of the supreme court of
the District of Columbia, and was otherwise qualified as set forth in the bill
(three years of practice and a person of good moral character, as with male
attorneys), she may be admitted to practice before the U.S. Supreme Court.157
Working in a Congress with all male members, her bill became law within one
year.158
Senator Aaron Sargent of California pushed hard for passage.159 His
appeal looked to future opportunities in America, not to the doctrines of
Blackstone and British precedents.160 Expressing a view that could not be
found in state or federal court, he said men do not have the right “in
contradiction to the intentions, the wishes, the ambitions, of women, to say
that their sphere shall be circumscribed, that bounds shall be set which they
cannot pass.”161 The pursuit of happiness “in her own way, is as much the
birthright of woman as of man.”162 It was “mere oppression to say to the breadseeking woman, you shall labor only in certain narrow ways for your living,
we will hedge out by law from profitable employments, and monopolize them
for ourselves.”163
Judicial attitudes about the rights of women and the law of coverture
continued well into the twentieth century.164 Not until 1971 did the Supreme
Court issue an opinion striking down sex discrimination. A unanimous Court
declared invalid an Idaho law that preferred men over women in administering
estates.165 A study published that year denounced the failure of courts to
defend the rights of women: “Our conclusion, independently reached, but
completely shared, is that by and large the performance of American judges in
154
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the area of sex discrimination can be succinctly described as ranging from poor
to abominable.”166
B. Civil Rights Cases of 1883
In the same manner that the Supreme Court blocked the rights of women,
so did it obstruct congressional efforts after the Civil War to extend rights to
blacks.167 Although the Civil War amendments formally elevated blacks to the
status of citizen, in many states they were denied access to public facilities.168
Congressional legislation in 1875 entitled all persons in the United States to
the “full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities,
and privileges of inns, public conveyances [transportation] on land and water,
theaters, and other places of public amusement.”169
In the House, Chair of the Judiciary Committee Benjamin Butler of
Massachusetts rejected the charge that Congress was attempting to impose a
national standard of “social equality” among blacks and whites. The issue, he
said, was one of law: “The colored men are either American citizens or they
are not. . . . and the moment they were clothed with that attribute of citizenship,
they stood on a political and legal equality with every other citizen, be he
whom he may.”170 Social equality, he explained, has nothing to do with law.171
Everyone has the right to select friends and associates.172 Those choices had
nothing to do with access to public accommodations or to decide who someone
sits next to in a theater, restaurant, or train.173 President Ulysses S. Grant
signed the bill into law.174
In the Civil Rights Cases (1883), the Court struck down the public
accommodations provision as a federal encroachment on the states and an
interference with private relationships.175 Only one Justice dissented, but it is
one of the finest dissents ever written. Justice John Marshall Harlan reviewed
precedents that covered public conveyances on land and water.176 States
166
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created railroads as public highways for public use.177 Even if controlled and
owned by private corporations, railroads functioned as public highways “for
the convenience of the public.”178 Railroads acquired new territory because
states seized land through the power of eminent domain.179 States regulated
railroads by enacting speed and safety standards.180
As to inns and taverns, Harlan acknowledged that private owners built
them without the state assistance given to railroads.181 But an innkeeper
offered lodging to travelers seeking shelter for the night.182 Under laws
existing for centuries, it was an innkeeper’s duty to take all travelers and offer
them room and food.183 The innkeeper functioned as a public servant.184 Places
of public amusement received no state assistance, as with railroads, and there
was no issue of needing shelter or food for the night.185 However, places of
public amusement, including theaters, were not purely private
establishments.186 They were established and licensed by public officials.187
What Congress attempted to do in 1875 with respect to public
accommodations finally prevailed, but not until almost a century later.
Congress included in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 a section on public
accommodations, relying on both the Fourteenth Amendment and the
commerce power.188 Private groups lobbied for the bill, creating a political
base that helped educate citizens and build public support.189 The rights of
blacks were secured through this majoritarian process, not through judicial
action. In two unanimous decisions, the Court relied on the commerce power
to uphold the public accommodation title.190 The active, driving, and reliable
judgment in protecting constitutional rights of minorities came from the
elected branches finally overcoming judicial obstruction.
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C. Plessy
From 1865 to the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, the Supreme Court issued a
number of decisions that weakened the promise and commitment of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. The Slaughter-House
Cases of 1873 expressed strong judicial support for independent state
powers.191 The majority rejected interpretations of the Civil War Amendments
that would “fetter and degrade the State governments by subjecting them to
the control of Congress.”192 In United States v. Cruikshank (1876), the Court
promoted the doctrine of “dual federalism,” attempting to establish a pure
separation between federal and state powers: “The powers which one
possesses, the other does not.”193 Under that theory, state sovereignty could
prevail over national powers exercised through the Civil War Amendments.
The protection of due process and equal protection would be left to the
states.194
In the years following the Civil War, there was no clear pattern in the
South of segregating blacks and whites in transportation systems.195
Sometimes blacks and whites traveled in the same railroad car.196 Southern
transportation “was not rigidly segregated in the quarter-century after the Civil
War.”197 By the late 1880s, however, some Southern states began passing Jim
Crow transportation laws to separate blacks and whites.198 The timing here is
significant. This movement came after the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights
Cases invalidated the equal accommodations statute passed by Congress.
Through that decisive step the Court opened the door to the “separate but
equal” doctrine in public accommodations, which would have been
impermissible under the Civil Rights Act of 1875.
In Plessy, the Court divided 7 to 1 in upholding a Louisiana statute enacted
in 1890.199 The law required railway companies to provide equal but separate
accommodations for white and black passengers, either by having two or more
coaches for each train or by using a partition to divide the two races.200 For
passengers who insisted on going into a coach or compartment where they did
not belong, the state could impose fines or imprisonment.201 The statute made
191
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one exception.202 It did not apply “to nurses attending children of the other
race.”203 A conductor ordered Homer Plessy, seven-eighths Caucasian and
one-eighth black, to leave the white coach and move to a black coach, and
when he refused, a police officer removed him and he was imprisoned.204
Justice Henry Billings Brown wrote for the majority to uphold the
Louisiana statute, relying in part on the Civil Rights Cases that refused blacks
equal accommodation to public facilities, including railroads.
Such
restrictions, he said, “cannot be justly regarded as imposing any badge of
slavery or servitude” under the Thirteenth Amendment.205 As to the
Fourteenth Amendment, he sought guidance from the Slaughter-House Cases,
which greatly undermined national authority provided in the Civil War
Amendments and gave added protection to independent state rights.206
Justice Brown said it was a question “whether the statute of Louisiana is a
reasonable regulation, and with respect to this there must necessarily be a large
discretion on the part of the legislature.”207 The Court extended no such
deference to Congress when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Brown
added, “[i]f one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the
United States cannot put them upon the same plane.”208 The case had nothing
to do with social equality. The issue was equal access to public facilities.
In his dissent, Justice Harlan pointed out that no one disputed that a
railroad “is a public highway” and that the corporation who owns and operates
it exercises a public function.209 He predicted that Plessy would “prove to be
quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott
Case.”210 Plessy remained in force until the Supreme Court decided Brown v.
Board of Education in 1954.211
V. TWENTIETH-CENTURY CASES UP TO 1944
Jamal Greene’s 2011 study singled out two twentieth-century decisions
that merit being called anticanon: Lochner and Korematsu.212 Other cases
cited as poorly reasoned in the twentieth century include the mandatory
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sterilization case of Buck v. Bell (1927) and the sodomy case of Bowers v.
Hardwick (1986).213 This section begins with Lochner and turns to Buck v.
Bell, the child-labor cases, the “sole-organ” doctrine of Curtiss-Wright, the
flag-salute case of 1940, and the Japanese-American cases. Section V
examines Court decisions issued after World War II.
A. Lochner
In Lochner v. New York (1905), the Court struck down a state law that
limited bakery workers to 60 hours per week or ten hours per day.214 Justice
Peckham, writing for a 5-4 majority, converted the general right to make a
contract into laissez-faire doctrine.215 He found no “reasonable ground” to
interfere with the liberty of an employee to contract for as many hours of work
as desired.216 The statute seemed to him to serve no purpose in safeguarding
public health or the health of the worker.217 Such laws he called “mere
meddlesome interferences” with the rights of an individual to freely enter into
contracts.218
In their dissent, Justices Harlan, White, and Day reviewed previous
holdings of the Court that interpreted the police power of states to permit
government regulation over the economy.219 In a separate dissent, Justice
Holmes accused the majority of deciding “upon an economic theory which a
large part of the country does not entertain.”220 The Constitution, he said, is
“not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism
and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire.”221
Subsequent Court rulings did not adhere to judicial finality. They were
not entirely wedded to Lochner and its so-called “equality of right” for
employers and employees to enter into a contract. In 1908, for example, the
Court sustained Oregon’s ten-hour day for women.222 A 5-4 Court in 1917
upheld a congressional statute setting an eight-hour day for railroad workers
engaged in interstate commerce.223 In that same year, the Court supported the
constitutionality of Oregon’s ten-hour day for both men and women.224 In
1923, a 5-3 Court swung back in the other direction by holding against a
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congressional statute that provided for minimum wages for women and
children in the District of Columbia.225
The philosophy of Lochner survived as late as 1936 when a 5-4 Court
struck down New York’s minimum wage law for women and children. 226
“Freedom of contract,” said the Court, “is the general rule and restraint the
exception.”227 The 1923 Adkins decision was finally overruled in 1937, when
a 5-4 Court upheld a minimum wage law for women and minors in the state of
Washington.228 For more than three decades, the Court tried to impose a
liberty-of-contract theory. By 1941, three conservative Justices (Sutherland,
Butler, and Van Devanter) had been replaced by more moderate Justices
(Reed, Murphy, and Black).229 Subsequent decisions made it clear that
policies concerning economic and social philosophy would include the elected
branches, not decidedly exclusively by the courts.230
B. Buck v. Bell
Highly damaging to the Court’s reputation and the rights of individuals is
Buck v. Bell (1927), upholding mandatory sterilization.231 Earlier decisions by
federal and state courts rejected efforts to sterilize prisoners for reasons of
eugenics.232 In 1914, a federal district court struck down a law that required a
vasectomy for criminals convicted twice of a felony (even if “felonies” merely
consisted of breaking an electric globe or unfastening a strap on a harness).233
The court regarded mandatory vasectomy a cruel and unusual punishment that
“belongs to the dark ages.”234 A Nevada law on mandatory sterilization was
struck down in 1918 because it gave judges too much discretion.235
A Virginia court in 1925 upheld the state’s mandatory sterilization law as
a proper use of the police power to prevent the transmission of insanity, idiocy,
imbecility, epilepsy, and crime.236 The case involved Carrie Buck, who had
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been placed in a state institution at age 18.237 Her mother had been committed
to the same institution, and Carrie had given birth to an illegitimate child the
state claimed to be of “defective mentality.”238 By an 8-to-1 majority, a threepage opinion by Justice Holmes in Buck v. Bell affirmed the state law.239
The decision is marred in several ways. The case was wholly contrived
without any adversarial quality. Irving Whitehead, Carrie’s attorney, was a
longtime friend of the state legislators who drafted the sterilization law.240 He
served on the board of the institution in which Carrie lived.241 While on the
board, he helped approve the sterilization of more than two dozen women. 242
In that capacity he worked with the institution’s physician who regularly
advocated sterilization and made that recommendation for Carrie.243 As a
“friendly suit” brought by two parties agreeing on the same outcome, the
Supreme Court lacked the necessary benefit of briefs and oral argument by
rival adversaries who could properly inform the Court.244
Had the regular judicial process been followed, the Court would have
learned that school records indicated that Carrie was a normal child and that
she became pregnant when raped by the nephew of the foster parents Carrie
lived with.245 There was no evidence that Carrie’s child was feebleminded.246
Justice Holmes defended the state law by arguing that if the government can
send men to war to be injured and even killed, it could order the lesser penalty
of mandatory sterilization of the “unfit.”247 It would be difficult to find Court
language more poorly reasoned. He closed with: “The principle that sustains
compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.
Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”248
Buck v. Bell has never been explicitly overruled. In 1942, the Supreme
Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that provided for mandatory
sterilization of “habitual criminals,” but the law provided an exception for
certain offenses, including embezzlement.249 To the Court, permitting the
sterilization of someone who had been convicted once for stealing chickens
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and twice for robbery violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.250
Although never formally overruled in the courts, the reasoning and results
of Buck v. Bell have been thoroughly discredited by the elected branches. In
2002, Virginia Governor Mark Warner formally apologized for the state’s
policy on eugenics, under which some 8,000 people were involuntarily
sterilized from 1927 to 1979.251 Reflecting the views of the state legislature in
2002, he said the eugenics movement “was a shameful effort in which state
government never should have been involved.”252 Nationwide, the practice
affected an estimated 65,000 Americans.253 In 2012, a North Carolina task
force investigated the state’s record of mandatory sterilization from 1929 to
1974 and proposed financial compensation for each living victim.254
C. Child-Labor Legislation
The reputation of the Court for reliable constitutional interpretation was
severely damaged by two decisions that struck down congressional efforts to
regulate child labor. By the turn of the twentieth century, private organizations
and political parties began to lobby Congress to eliminate the harsh and
unhealthy conditions of child labor.255 Initial efforts began at the state level
until it became clear that national legislation was needed.256 In 1916, the
House Labor Committee concluded that “the entire problem has become an
interstate problem rather than a problem of isolated States and is a problem
which must be faced and solved only by a power stronger than any State.”257
Legislation regulating child labor became law on September 1, 1916.258 It
prohibited the shipment in interstate or foreign commerce of any article
produced by children within specified age ranges: under the age of 16 for
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products from a mine or quarry, and under the age of 14 from any mill,
cannery, workshop, factory, or manufacturing establishment.259
Two years later, a 5-4 Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart struck down the
statute as unconstitutional.260 The Court ruled that the steps of “production”
and “manufacture” of goods were local in origin and therefore not part of
“commerce” among the states subject to regulation by Congress.261 The Court
reasoned that although child labor might be harmful, the goods shipped from
their efforts “are of themselves harmless.”262 To the majority, efforts to deal
with child labor must be left to the states. The dissenters argued that Congress,
not the Court, was the agency of government constitutionally authorized to
determine and settle these policy questions. They disagreed that it was
permissible to allow regulation “against strong drink but not as against the
product of ruined lives.”263
Members of Congress did not regard the Court’s decision as the final word.
Instead, they prepared legislation to regulate child labor through the taxing
power. A federal excise tax would be levied on the net profit of persons
employing child labor within prohibited ages.264 The bill passed Congress and
became law in 1919.265 When the issue reached the Supreme Court, Solicitor
General James M. Beck urged the Justices to exercise institutional and political
restraint when reviewing legislation supported by the elected branches.266
The Court ignored Beck’s counsel, striking down the new child labor law
by a vote of 8 to 1.267 Justice Clarke dissented without providing any reason.268
Congress passed a constitutional amendment in 1924 to empower it to regulate
child labor. By 1937, only 28 of the necessary 36 states had ratified it.269
Beginning in 1937, conservative Justices began to retire, giving President
Franklin D. Roosevelt his first opportunity to name Justices to the Court. 270
With this change in the Court’s composition underway, Congress in 1938
259
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passed legislation to regulate child labor, relying on the same power that the
Court had earlier invalidated: the Commerce Clause.271
In 1941, a thoroughly reconstituted (and chastened) Court not only upheld
the new statute but did so unanimously.272 Moreover, it proceeded to publicly
apologize for the Court’s earlier effort to distinguish between the “production”
and “manufacture” of goods (regarded as local in origin) and interstate
commerce subject to regulation by Congress.273 Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone noted: “While manufacture is not of itself interstate
commerce the shipment of manufactured goods interstate is such commerce
and the prohibition of such shipment by Congress is indubitably a regulation
of the commerce.”274 Congress may exclude from interstate commerce
whatever goods it considers injurious to the public health, morals, or
welfare.275 Those constitutional judgments, said the Court, are left to the
elected branches, not the judiciary. To Chief Justice Stone, the reasoning
offered by the Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart “was novel when made and
unsupported by any provision of the Constitution.”276 No support in the
Constitution! That stands as a remarkable and healthy admission of judicial
error.
D. Curtiss-Wright
In dicta by Justice George Sutherland in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., the Court departed from the core issue presented to it—whether
Congress could delegate power to the President in the field of international
relations—and instead announced an erroneous definition of exclusive and
plenary presidential power in foreign affairs.277 The case resulted from
legislation passed by Congress in 1934, authorizing the President to prohibit
the sale of arms in the Chaco region in South America whenever he found “it
may contribute to the reestablishment of peace” between belligerents.278 At
issue was legislative, not presidential, power. When President Roosevelt
imposed the embargo, he relied solely on statutory authority. His proclamation
prohibiting the sale of arms and munitions began: “NOW, THEREFORE, I,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America,
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acting and by virtue of the authority conferred in me by the said joint resolution
of Congress . . . .”279
Litigation focused on legislative power because the Court in 1935 twice
struck down delegation by Congress of domestic power to the President.280
The issue in Curtiss-Wright was therefore whether Congress could delegate
this particular legislative power in international affairs.281 A district court,
holding that the joint resolution impermissibly delegated legislative authority,
said nothing about any reservoir of exclusive or plenary presidential power.282
The case was taken directly to the Supreme Court. None of the briefs on
either side discussed the availability of exclusive and plenary powers for the
President in foreign affairs.283 To the Justice Department, the question went
to “the very power of Congress to delegate to the Executive authority to
investigate and make findings in order to implement a legislative purpose.”284
The source of authority was plainly legislative. The brief for the private
company, Curtiss-Wright, focused on the delegation of legislative power and
did not explore the existence of exclusive and plenary presidential power.285
A separate brief, prepared for other private parties, concentrated on the
delegation of legislative power and did not identify any freestanding or
freewheeling presidential authority.286
Writing for the Court, Justice Sutherland reversed the district court and
upheld the delegation of legislative power to the President to place an arms
embargo on the Chaco region.287 That should have marked the end of his
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decision, but in dicta he began to introduce a number of errors.288 Scholars
took Sutherland to task for twisting historical and constitutional precedents.289
Sutherland claimed that the Constitution commits treaty negotiation
exclusively to the President: “He makes treaties with the advice and consent
of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate
cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.”290 To understand
why that is false, one need only refer to Sutherland’s book, published in 1919,
which reflects his experience as a U.S. Senator. He acknowledged that his
colleagues participated in the negotiation phase and Presidents acceded to this
“practical construction.”291 Presidents also invited members of the House of
Representatives to participate in treaty negotiation as a means of building
political support for authorization and appropriation bills needed to implement
treaties.292
Another error is Sutherland’s plain distortion of a speech John Marshall
gave in 1800 as a member of the House of Representatives. Sutherland used
that speech to create for the President a source of power in foreign affairs that
was not grounded in authority delegated by Congress:
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not
alone with an authority vested in the President by an assertion
of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the
sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations . . . .293
Marshall’s speech included this sentence: “The President is the sole organ of
the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign
nations.”294 The phrase “sole organ” is ambiguous. “Sole” means exclusive
but what is “organ”? Simply the President’s duty to communicate to other
nations U.S. policy decided by the elected branches? Anyone reading the
entire speech would understand that Marshall did not advocate exclusive or
plenary power for the President in external affairs. Such an interpretation
would ignore the plain text of Articles I and II of the Constitution.
288
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The purpose of Marshall’s speech was to defend the decision of President
John Adams to carry out an extradition provision of the Jay Treaty. Adams
was not the sole organ in formulating the treaty. He was the sole organ in
implementing it.295 In subsequent years, the Supreme Court and lower courts
regularly cited the sole-organ doctrine in Curtiss-Wright but failed to
understand what Marshall actually meant.296 Repeating Sutherland’s dicta
without reading the speech injured the reputation of the judiciary as
constitutional interpreter, improperly inflated presidential power, and
weakened the system of checks and balances.297
Because of litigation on the Jerusalem passport case, Zivotofsky v. Kerry,
the Supreme Court had an opportunity to correct the erroneous dicta added to
Curtiss-Wright. On July 17, 2014, I filed an amicus brief with the Court
identifying the errors and asking the Court to issue corrections.298 While the
Court is in session, the National Law Journal runs a column called “Brief of
the Week.” It selected my amicus brief in Zivotofsky and chose this title: “Can
the Supreme Court Correct Erroneous Dicta?”299 The Court did jettison the
sole-organ doctrine in 2015 but retained other errors from Curtiss-Wright,
including the notion that treaty negotiation is committed exclusively to the
President.300
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E. Flag-Salute Case of 1940
In 1940, a commanding 8-1 majority of the Supreme Court upheld a
compulsory flag salute that forced children to violate their religious beliefs.301
The parents of two Jehovah’s Witness children objected that the flag salute
violated their interpretation of the biblical provision not to bow down to any
graven image.302 In 1937, a federal district judge declared the statute
unconstitutional.303 School authorities concluded that a refusal to salute the
flag constituted an act of insubordination requiring expulsion.304 To the
federal judge, the state could not violate religious beliefs unless it could
demonstrate that it was necessary for the public safety, health, morals,
property, or personal rights.305 The Third Circuit upheld this decision, finding
it difficult to see “the essential relationship between infant patriotism and the
martial spirit.”306
On the last day of the Court’s term, June 3, 1940, Justice Frankfurter
upheld the compulsory flag salute.307 He relied on a central premise: “National
unity is the basis of national security.”308 From there he concluded that forcing
children to salute the flag against their religious beliefs helps foster national
unity. He asserted, “[t]he ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding
tie of cohesive sentiment.”309 The dissent by Justice Stone rejected
Frankfurter’s emphasis on national security and national unity: “History
teaches us that there have been but few infringements of personal liberty by
the state which have not been justified, as they are here, in the name of
righteousness and the public good, and few which have not been directed, as
they are now, at politically helpless minorities.”310
Far from accepting the Court’s decision as the exclusive and final word on
the meaning of the Constitution, Frankfurter’s opinion was assailed by law
journals, the press, and religious organizations. The New Republic, which
Frankfurter helped found, warned that the country was “in great danger of
adopting Hitler’s philosophy in the effort to oppose Hitler’s legions,” accusing
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the Court of coming “dangerously close to being a victim of [war] hysteria.”311
Out of 39 law reviews that discussed Gobitis, 31 raised objections, while
newspapers condemned the Court for violating individual rights and buckling
to popular prejudices.312 Editorials in 171 newspapers tore apart Frankfurter’s
opinion.313
Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy came to regret their decision to
support Frankfurter. In 1942, they publicly announced that Gobitis was
“wrongly decided,”314 leaving Frankfurter with a narrow 5-4 majority.315
Chief Justice Hughes retired in 1941 and was succeeded by Stone.316 Two
Justices who joined with Frankfurter (Byrnes and Roberts) were replaced by
Wiley Rutledge and Robert H. Jackson.317 Rutledge’s opinions while on the
D.C. Circuit suggested he would vote against Frankfurter.318
Jackson, writing for a 6-3 majority, overruled Gobitis.319 He prepared a
masterful defense of individual freedom and religious liberty, but credit for the
reversal belongs to those who refused to accept Frankfurter’s opinion as the
final word. Citizens around the country told the Court it did not understand
the Constitution, minority rights, or religious liberty. Their independent voices
prompted Black, Douglas, and Murphy to rethink their positions and switch
sides.
F. Japanese-American Cases
In Korematsu v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the relocation
of Japanese Americans (two-thirds of them U.S. citizens) to detention
camps.320 With no evidence of disloyalty or subversive activity and without
benefit of any procedural safeguards, the United States imprisoned Japanese
311
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Americans solely on grounds of race.321 The previous year, in Hirabayashi v.
United States, the Court upheld a curfew placed on Japanese Americans on the
west coast.322
Dissenting in Korematsu, Justice Murphy protested that the exclusion was
based on an “erroneous assumption of racial guilt” found in General John
DeWitt’s report, which referred to all individuals of Japanese dissent as
“subversives” belonging to “an enemy race” whose “racial strains are
undiluted.”323 In dissent, Justice Jackson deferred to executive-military
judgments.324 With “no real evidence before it,” the Court had “no choice but
to accept General DeWitt’s own unsworn, self-serving statement, untested by
any cross-examination, that what he did was reasonable. And thus it will
always be when courts try to look into the reasonableness of a military
order.”325
Jackson had an opportunity to probe the basis for the exclusion order. He
claimed the Court had “no choice.”326 Justices always have a choice. Certainly
they had a choice in analyzing a DeWitt statement that was unsworn, selfserving, and untested by cross-examination. A dissent by Justice Murphy
identified an effective and principled way to challenge executive assertions:
“justification for the exclusion is sought, instead, mainly upon questionable
racial and sociological grounds not ordinarily within the realm of expert
military judgment.”327 The Court was not faced with what might be called a
“military judgment.” There was no reason to defer to DeWitt’s purely
prejudiced and ignorant beliefs about race and sociology.328
On February 20, 1976, President Gerald Ford publicly apologized for the
treatment of Japanese Americans, resolving that “this kind of action shall never
again be repeated.”329 A congressional commission in December 1982 stated
that Roosevelt’s executive order “was not justified by military necessity.” The
policies of curfew and detention “were not driven by analysis of military
conditions.”330 The factors shaping those decisions were “race prejudice, war
hysteria and a failure of political leadership.”331 One could add: abandonment
of judicial independence.
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The wrongs done in Hirabayashi and Korematsu were later corrected by
lower federal courts, not by the Supreme Court.332 Hirabayashi and
Korematsu returned to court after newly discovered documents revealed that
executive officials had deceived the judiciary.333 They learned that the
executive branch had withheld vital evidence from the courts.334 The Justice
Department had a duty to inform the judiciary about false allegations. Its brief
should have clearly identified the errors.335 Instead, a footnote was so
reworked and watered down that the courts could not possibly have understood
the extent to which the administration had misled them.336
After Korematsu brought a coram nobis case, charging fraud against the
Court, a district court in 1984 concluded that the executive branch had
“knowingly withheld information from the courts when they were considering
the critical question of military necessity in this case.”337 The record provided
“substantial support” that the government “deliberately omitted relevant
information and provided misleading information in papers before the
court.”338 The district court vacated Korematsu’s conviction and the Justice
Department did not appeal.339
Hirabayashi challenged his conviction for violating the curfew order.340
The Justice Department had argued that the government lacked time to
separate loyal Japanese Americans from those who might be subversive.341
However, General DeWitt believed that because of racial ties, filial piety, and
strong bonds of common tradition, culture, and customs, it was “impossible to
establish the identity of the loyal and the disloyal with any degree of safety.”342
For DeWitt, there was no “such a thing as a loyal Japanese.”343 The initial
draft report contained his remarks but the final report, after War Department
editing, did not.344 The Justice Department received the final report but not
the draft version.345
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In 1986, a district court ruled that although the Justice Department “did
not knowingly conceal” from Hirabayashi’s counsel and the Supreme Court
the racial grounds DeWitt offered for excluding Japanese, it was necessary to
charge the executive branch with concealment because the information was
known to the War Department, an arm of government.346 The failure by the
executive branch to disclose DeWitt’s position “was an error of the most
fundamental character.”347 Hirabayashi “was in fact seriously prejudiced by
that non-disclosure in his appeal from his conviction for failing to report.”348
The district court vacated that conviction but declined to vacate his conviction
for violating the curfew order.349 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated both
convictions.350
VI. THE JUDICIAL RECORD AFTER WORLD WAR II
Supreme Court decisions analyzed in this section cover the state secrets
case of United States v. Reynolds, school busing initiatives by the Supreme
Court, the trimester framework of Roe v. Wade, the federalism decision of
National League of Cities, legislative vetoes, designating corporations as
persons, and campaign finance.
A. State Secrets Case of 1953
In response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Bush administration
invoked the “state secrets privilege” to block efforts by private litigants to gain
access to agency documents to challenge constitutional violations, including
warrantless surveillance and the policy of “extraordinary rendition” used to
transfer individuals to other countries for interrogation and torture.351 The
Justice Department advised federal courts that the cases could not proceed
without jeopardizing national security and foreign policy.352 If courts defer to
that argument, the executive branch is at liberty to violate statutes and
individual rights without any judicial checks.
The executive branch relied heavily on United States v. Reynolds (1953),
the first time the Supreme Court recognized the state secrets privilege in its
full scope.353 The case involved a B-29 that exploded over Waycross, Georgia,
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on October 6, 1948.354 The widows of three civilian engineers killed in the
crash filed a tort claims action and asked for the official accident report to
determine if there had been government negligence.355 Their attorneys
submitted a number of interrogatories to the government, asking whether the
government had prescribed modifications for the B-29 to prevent overheating
of the engines to reduce fire hazards.356 If modifications had been carried out,
the interrogatory asked for details.357 In each case the government answered
“No.”358 When the three families discovered the declassified accident report
in 2000, they realized the government’s answer was false.359
District Judge William Kirkpatrick decided on June 30, 1950, that the
accident report on the B-29 crash was not “privileged.”360 He directed the
government to give him the accident report to be read in his chambers.361
When the government refused, he ruled for the widows.362 On December 11,
1951, a unanimous Third Circuit upheld his decision.363 If it allowed the
privilege, it said it would be a small step “to assert a privilege against the
disclosure of records merely because they might prove embarrassing to
government officers.”364 To permit the government as a party to “conclusively
determine the Government’s claim of privilege is to abdicate the judicial
function and permit the executive branch of the Government to infringe the
independent province of the judiciary as laid down by the Constitution.”365
Both the district court and the Third Circuit properly defended judicial
independence.
The government’s brief to the Supreme Court continued to muddle the
basic issue by writing, “to the extent that the report reveals military secrets
concerning the structure or performance of the plane that crashed or deals with
these factors in relation to projected or suggested secret improvements it falls
within the judicially recognized ‘state secret’ privilege.”366 To the extent? Did
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the report contain state secrets or not? That question could be answered only
if the Court read the report, which it chose not to do.367
For a 6-3 Court, Chief Justice Fred Vinson announced incoherent
principles of judicial responsibility.368 He said the Court “itself must
determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege,
and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is
designed to protect.”369 Disclosure to the public is a legitimate concern, but
there is no such risk when Justices read an accident report in their chambers.
By failing to examine the report, the Court could not possibly determine
“whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege.”370 The
Court accepted at face value a self-serving statement by the executive branch,
an assertion that turned out to be false.371
Through disjointed reasoning, Vinson placed courts in an inferior
institutional position. Without looking at the accident report, the Court could
not independently evaluate the merits of a privilege claimed by an executive
official. Nor could it protect the rights of the three widows. The Court
surrendered to the executive branch fundamental judicial duties in deciding
questions of privilege and access to evidence. Refusing to examine the report,
the Court took the risk of being hoodwinked by the executive branch. As it
turned out, it was.
In 2000, the three widows obtained a copy of the declassified accident
report.372 In reading the report, their attorneys realized it contained no state
secrets.373 It did, however, reveal that the government had been negligent by
not installing heat shields in the B-29 to avoid overheating of the engines.374
The Air Force committed other negligent acts.375 The executive branch misled
the Court in 1953 just as it did with the Japanese-American cases. The families
filed a writ of coram nobis, charging that the executive branch had misled the
judiciary and committed fraud against it.376 They filed the writ first with the
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Supreme Court, but the Court declined to take it.377 They had to start over in
district court.378
The widows lost in district court on September 10, 2004, and their appeal
to the Third Circuit failed on September 22, 2005.379 On May 1, 2006, the
Supreme Court denied cert.380 The constitutional value given short shrift in
this coram nobis is the need to protect the integrity, independence, and
reputation of the federal judiciary and the rights of private litigants. When
courts operate in that manner, citizens lose faith in the judiciary, the rule of
law, the adversary legal system, and the constitutional principle of checks and
balances.
From 2006 to 2010, I worked with the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees on legislation designed to increase judicial independence in state
secrets cases. Judges would look at documents in camera instead of taking at
face value the government’s assertions offered in various declarations and
affidavits. I presented testimony before both committees in support of the
legislation.381 The committees marked up their bills and reported them, but
there was no floor debate on legislation that would go to the President.
When President Obama took office he objected that the state secrets
privilege had been overused by the Bush II administration, including cases
involving torture.382 Yet his Justice Department continued to apply the
privilege to cases it inherited and invoked it in new litigation, with federal
courts generally deferring to executive claims that documents sought in court
may not be read by plaintiffs or federal judges.383 Reynolds need not be the
last word. The elected branches have both a duty and authority to increase
judicial independence in these cases. Leadership is more likely to come from
Congress, given the general preference of the executive branch for withholding
documents in litigation.
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B. School Busing
The Supreme Court’s desegregation decision in Brown v. Board of
Education (1954) did little to integrate public schools. Part of the delay came
from vague guidelines issued by the Court the next year, in Brown v. Board of
Education (1955), directing states to move “with all deliberate speed.”384 As
late as 1964, the Court complained there “has been entirely too much
deliberation and not enough speed” in enforcing Brown.385 Two years later a
federal appellate court remarked: “A national effort, bringing together
Congress, the executive and the judiciary may be able to make meaningful the
right of Negro children to equal educational opportunities. The courts acting
alone have failed.”386
In 1971, a unanimous Court held that district courts possessed broad power
to fashion remedies to desegregate schools.387 To achieve greater racial
balance, judges could alter school district lines, reassign teachers, and bus
students.388 That same year a unanimous Court struck down state antibusing
laws.389 Busing spread to non-southern states, including Denver, Colorado and
Michigan.390
Decisions that had been either unanimous or with a 7-1 majority now gave
way to split decisions. Two other northern school systems, in Columbus and
Dayton, Ohio, came before the Supreme Court.391 Because there had been de
jure segregation, school officials were required to take steps to desegregate.392
Chief Justice Burger remarked that it “is becoming increasingly doubtful that
massive public transportation really accomplishes the desirable objectives
sought.”393 Justice Powell, in a dissent, warned that parents resentful of courtordered integration might withdraw their children from public schools by
relocating (“white flight”) or enroll them in private schools.394 Either action
would lead to resegregation of public schools.395
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As described by constitutional scholar Jeffrey Rosen, court-ordered
busing “produced a firestorm of resistance from the president and Congress
that never abated.”396 A Gallup poll in 1973 found a clear majority backing
integration but only 5 percent supporting busing.397 Court-ordered busing
reflected “judicial unilateralism of the most aggressive kind.”398 Confronted
with congressional and presidential opposition, federal judges “proved unable
and ultimately unwilling to impose an unpopular and destabilizing social
reform on their own.”399 Eventually, the judiciary abandoned busing as a
remedy for desegregation.400
C. Roe v. Wade
The Supreme Court faced a complex and politically charged issue in Roe
v. Wade (1973).401 How could abortions be performed to satisfy the competing
values of those who wanted abortion on demand and those who believed in an
embryo’s right to life? Various states wrestled with the issue. It became a
national controversy when the Court decided to “settle it” for the entire
country. The decision represented a serious political and institutional
miscalculation. As Linda Greenhouse has noted, the manner in which the
Court handled the issue deeply split the nation and gave “rise to the religious
Right,”402 a political development that continues to this day.
Justice Blackmun wrote for a 7-to-2 Court, with Justices White and
Rehnquist in dissent.403 Concurrences by Justices Stewart and Douglas and
Chief Justice Burger added to the fragmentation.404 The Court struck down a
Texas statute that prohibited abortion except on medical advice for the purpose
of saving the woman’s life.405 It held that a woman’s right to privacy, whether
found in the Fourteenth Amendment or the Ninth Amendment, “is broad
396
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enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.”406 However, it disagreed that a woman “is entitled to terminate
her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she
alone chooses.”407 It accepted as “reasonable and appropriate” for a state to
decide that at some point in time it may legislate to protect the health of the
mother and potential human life.408
Blackmun placed the state’s compelling interest “at viability,” which he
took to mean the ability of a fetus to survive “outside the mother’s womb.” 409
Medical technology was rapidly changing the concept of viability, with the
fetus able to survive outside the mother’s womb at much earlier stages.
Blackmun created a system of three periods (a trimester model) to decide the
rights of women and state authorities.410
In dissent, Rehnquist objected that “the conscious weighing of competing
factors that the Court’s opinion apparently substitutes for the established test
is far more appropriate to a legislative judgment than to a judicial one.” 411
White’s dissent, printed in a companion case, remarked: “As an exercise of
raw judicial power, the Court perhaps has authority to do what it does today;
but in my view its judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of the
power of judicial review that the Constitution extends to this Court.”412
An early critique of Roe by John Hart Ely identified some principal
weaknesses.413 Blackmun’s opinion consisted of “drawing lines with an
apparent precision one generally associates with a commissioner’s regulations.
On closer examination, however, the precision proves largely illusory.”414 Ely
noted that the concept of viability “will become even less clear than it is now
as the technology of birth continues to develop.”415 The “problem with Roe is
not so much that it bungles the question it sets itself, but rather that it sets itself
a question the Constitution has not made the Court’s business.”416
Support for the trimester framework continued to erode as new Justices,
including Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy,
joined the Court. The changed composition of the Court was evident in a 1989
decision, which reviewed a Missouri statute that imposed a number of
restrictions on a woman’s decision to have an abortion.417 Without overruling
406
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Roe, a plurality opinion by Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy rejected the
trimester framework.418 Scalia would have repealed all of Roe.419 In 1992, the
Court finally abandoned the trimester framework. An opinion by O’Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter specifically rejected it.420 Stevens and Blackmun
disagreed with the rejection.421 In their separate opinion, Rehnquist, White,
Scalia, and Thomas stated that Roe “was wrongly decided,” apparently
agreeing with the framework’s rejection without expressly saying so.422
What was learned from Roe v. Wade? Writing in 1985 while serving on
the D.C. Circuit, Ruth Bader Ginsburg said the decision became “a storm
center” and “sparked public opposition and academic criticism,” in part
“because the Court ventured too far in the change it ordered and presented an
incomplete justification for its action.”423 In 1992, after the Court rejected the
trimester framework and she was confirmed as Associate Justice, Ginsburg
explained:
[J]udges play an interdependent part in our democracy. They
do not alone shape legal doctrine, but . . . they participate in a
dialogue with other organs of government, and with the
people as well. . . . Measured motions seem to me right, in
the main, for constitutional as well as common law
adjudication.424
A “less encompassing” decision, she said, “might have served to reduce rather
than to fuel controversy.”425
D. National League of Cities
In National League of Cities v. Usery (1976), the Supreme Court decided
that Congress could not adopt federal minimum-wage and maximum-hour
provisions that displaced state powers.426 The Court’s theory of federalism
could not be consistently understood and applied in either the lower courts or
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by the Court itself. After nine years of confusion and frustration, Justice
Blackmun switched sides and pronounced the Court’s doctrine unworkable.427
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 expressly exempted all states and
their political divisions from federal minimum-wage and overtime
provisions.428 In 1966, however, Congress extended federal minimum wages
and overtime pay standards to state-operated hospitals and schools.429 Two
years later, in Maryland v. Wirtz, the Court upheld the statute as rationally
based, concluding that Congress had properly taken into account the effect on
interstate competition and the promotion of labor peace.430 Building on that
policy, the Court in 1975 upheld the short-term power of the President to
stabilize the wages and salaries of state employees.431
This mutual accord between the Court and the elected branches came to
an abrupt halt in 1976. Justice Rehnquist was able to attract four Justices to
his position that federal policy had invaded state powers.432 The Court now
decided that the independent status of the states needed to be preserved for
“traditional government functions” such as fire prevention, police protection,
sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation.433 National League of
Cities overruled Wirtz by holding that a congressional statute in 1974,
extending wage-and-hour provisions to almost all state employees, threatened
the independent existence of states.434
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens wrote sharply worded
dissents. In a tentative concurrence, Blackmun supplied the fifth vote to give
Rehnquist a majority.435 Blackmun said he was “not untroubled” by some
aspects of the Court’s position, but agreed to offer his support.436 Over the
next few years, evidence began to mount that Rehnquist’s theory of federalism
could not be defended or even understood.
The major difficulty lay with Rehnquist’s assumption that a clear line
could be drawn between traditional and nontraditional government functions.
The Supreme Court decided it would not, or could not, draw that line. It
delegated that task to the lower courts. A district court, lacking confidence in
determining the difference between the two functions, asked the Labor
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Department to identify nontraditional state functions.437 It did so, supplying a
list of traditional functions as well.438
Year after year, lower courts and the Supreme Court tried to figure out
what was traditional and nontraditional. Year after year they failed. In 1981,
a unanimous Court rejected a district court’s argument that land use regulation
was a “traditional governmental function” reserved to the states.439 A year
later, the Court reviewed a district court’s attempt to use National League of
Cities to prohibit Congress from regulating retail sales of electricity and
natural gas.440 The district court regarded this area of economic regulation as
traditional, but the Court said it was not.441 Other cases highlighted the inability
of courts to understand the difference between traditional and nontraditional
state functions.442
By 1985, Blackmun’s patience ended. His opinion in a mass transit case
nullified Rehnquist’s opinion issued nine years earlier.443 Blackmun explained
the difficulties that courts experienced trying to determine the difference
between traditional and nontraditional functions.444 In one example, a district
court decided that municipal ownership and operation of a mass-transit system
was a traditional governmental function.445 Three federal appellate courts and
one state appellate court reached the opposite conclusion.446 The effect of
Blackmun’s 5-4 decision was to take this element of federalism away from the
judiciary and leave it with the political process of Congress and the states. He
rejected “as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state
immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether
a particular governmental function is ‘integral’ or ‘traditional.’”447 To
Blackmun, the Court in National League of Cities “tried to repair what did not
need repair.”448
E. Legislative Vetoes
“As a way of controlling delegated authority, Congress has long relied on
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‘legislative vetoes.’ They do not become public law because they are not
submitted to the President. Controls can be exercised by both Houses (a
concurrent resolution) by either House (a simple resolution), and even by
committees and subcommittees. Legislative vetoes have a complex history
and cannot be described simply as congressional encroachments on executive
powers. Presidents and Attorneys General did more than tolerate them and
acquiesce.”449 They often invited and encouraged the growth of legislative
vetoes because they understood the benefits for the executive branch.450
Political accommodations that had supported the legislative veto largely
came to an end in 1978 when President Carter issued a broad critique. He
objected that this method of congressional control had grown rapidly in recent
years to cover many new areas, allowing Congress to control agency
regulations, federal salaries, presidential papers, arms sales, war powers,
national emergencies, and other areas of government.451
The case that reached the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha (1983) had
been handled circumspectly by the Ninth Circuit.452 Acting under statutory
authority, the House had disapproved 6 of 340 requests by the Attorney
General to suspend the deportation of aliens. The Ninth Circuit held that this
legislative veto violated the doctrine of separated powers and intruded
impermissibly into executive and judicial powers.453 But it carefully limited
the reach of its decision, confining it to legislative vetoes that affected
individual, adjudicative determinations.454 It specifically avoided commenting
on other types of legislative vetoes, such as those over agency regulations.455
In the year before the Supreme Court decided Chadha, I wrote an article
for the Washington Post explaining that some types of legislative vetoes would
survive no matter how the Court wrote its opinion. I referred to a procedure
where agencies had to seek the approval of designated committees and
subcommittees before moving appropriated funds from one area to another
(called the “reprogramming” process).456
449
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Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger held that whenever
congressional action has the “purpose and effect of altering the legal rights,
duties, and relations of persons” outside the legislative branch, Congress must
act through both Houses in a bill submitted to the President.457 The decision
effectively invalidated every form of legislative veto. Yet Burger wrote too
broadly. As the Justice Department acknowledges, each House of Congress
may alter the legal rights and duties of individuals outside the legislative
branch without resorting to bicameral action and presentment. The issuance
of committee subpoenas is one example.458
Neither agency officials nor lawmakers want the static, artificial model
developed by the Court. The conditions that spawned the legislative veto in
the past did not disappear. Executive officials still want substantial latitude to
administer delegated authority. Lawmakers still insist on maintaining control
in some areas without having to pass another statute. The elected branches
began to develop substitutes that could serve as the functional equivalent of
the legislative veto.
Instead of a one-House veto over reorganization proposals, Congress
could switch to a joint resolution of approval, which would satisfy both
bicameralism and presentment. But now the President would have to gain
approval from both Houses within a specific number of days. In previous
statutes, the President’s plan to reorganize the government would take effect
unless one House disapproved within a fixed number of days. A joint
resolution of approval reverses the burden. If one House decides to withhold
support, the practical effect is a one-House veto. That reality escaped the
Court.
The reprogramming process continues as before. Agency officials seek
approval from designated committees and subcommittees before funds can be
shifted from one account to another. In a book published in 2015, former
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recalled a problem he faced in 2011, trying
to reprogram money from one appropriations account to another.459 He needed
the support of four committees in the House and Senate.460 A compromise was
reached to move the funds.461 In another memoir, Leon Panetta reflected on
his years as CIA Director during the Obama administration.462 He described
how he met with congressional committees and leaders to gain the support of
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a reprogramming request.463 In those meetings, none of the participants in the
two branches give a thought about the Court’s decision in Chadha.
F. Corporations as Persons
In Buckley v. Valeo (1976) and Citizens United (2010), the Supreme Court
held that campaign expenditures by corporations may not be restricted by
Congress or the states.464 The decisions assert that corporations are persons,
money is speech, and corporate expenditures are protected by the First
Amendment.465 Because these decisions rest on what Justices themselves have
referred to as “inventions,” with the Court deeply divided in issuing both
rulings, there is little reason to believe that the decisions represent the final
word on constitutional principles.
In what sense are corporations persons under the Constitution and entitled
to rights available to natural persons? In the 1819 Dartmouth College case,
Chief Justice Marshall described a corporation as “an artificial being, invisible,
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.”466 As “the mere
creature of law,” it possesses only those properties conferred upon it.”467
Natural persons are not creatures of law. One property conferred by
legislatures on corporations, Marshall said, is immortality.468 No such
property extends to natural persons. On what reasonable grounds could his
analysis be turned aside?
The idea that corporations are persons under the Constitution first surfaced
in the Santa Clara case in 1886 without being briefed, argued, reasoned, or
even decided.469 Does that sound far-fetched? Consider the facts. Before oral
argument began, Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite told the parties:
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question
whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies
to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.470
His remark appears not in the Court’s decision but in the headnote prepared by
the clerk.
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The decision by Justice John Marshall Harlan did not refer to corporations
being “persons.” J. C. Bancroft Davis, the court reporter, asked Chief Justice
Waite if his remark before oral argument should be included in the headnote.471
Waite left that decision to Davis.472 The headnote begins: “The defendant
Corporations are persons within the intent of the clause in section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which forbids
a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”473 The Fourteenth Amendment does not call a corporation a “person.”
Section 1 opens with: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States . .
. .” Obviously that refers to natural persons, not artificial creations.
Corporations are not born or naturalized. Calling a corporation a person is a
metaphor, a legal fiction.474
Over the years, the Supreme Court has made many false and misleading
claims about Santa Clara. In 1896, Justice Harlan said it was “now settled
that corporations are persons under the Fourteenth Amendment,” citing Santa
Clara.475 In fact, his ruling did not say that. A decade later he corrected his
error. Writing for a unanimous Court, he said that the liberty guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment “is the liberty of natural, not artificial persons.”476
Clear enough, echoing Marshall’s decision in Dartmouth College.477 A year
later, another unanimous decision by Harlan said the Fourteenth Amendment
applies to “natural, not artificial, persons.”478 Had the Court finally returned
to a reasonable, credible position and decided to repudiate the headnote in
Santa Clara?
The record is clear that when the Supreme Court relies on erroneous dicta,
as in Curtiss-Wright, or in a misleading headnote, as in Santa Clara, those
mistakes and misconceptions will continue to influence future holdings. The
Court in 1888 cited Santa Clara and claimed it “is conceded” that corporations
are persons under the Fourteenth Amendment.479 Nothing in Harlan’s decision
conceded that point. A decision in 1889 claimed it was “so held” in Santa
Clara that private corporations are persons under the Fourteenth
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Amendment.480 There was no such holding. A Court ruling in 1892 also used
the words “so held.”481 The Court in 1897, citing Santa Clara carelessly, said
it was “well settled” that corporations are persons under the Fourteenth
Amendment.482 How could it be well settled when Santa Clara was not guided
by briefs, oral argument, or the Court’s decision?
Judicial misconceptions persisted. A dissent by Justice Black in 1938
added more confusion. After stating he did not believe the word “person” in
the Fourteenth Amendment included corporations,483 Black wrote falsely that
the Court in Santa Clara “decided for the first time that the word ‘person’ in
the Fourteenth Amendment did in some instances include corporations.”484
Nothing in Santa Clara decided that. A dissent by Justices Douglas and Black
in 1949 stated it was “so held” in Santa Clara that a corporation is a “person”
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.485 There
was no such holding. Justice Rehnquist, in a dissent in 1978, pointed to Justice
Harlan’s opinion for a unanimous Court in 1906 that the liberty under the
Fourteenth Amendment is “the liberty of natural, not artificial persons.” 486
Rehnquist added: “it cannot be disputed that the mere creation of a corporation
does not invest it with all the liberties enjoyed by natural persons,” pointing
out that corporations do not enjoy the privilege against self-incrimination.487
An important point, but Santa Clara continued to influence the Court.
In the 1978 case, with Rehnquist dissenting, the Court divided 5-4 in
striking down a Massachusetts statute that prohibited corporations from
making contributions or expenditures to referenda and elections.488 Speaking
for the Court, Justice Powell said: “If the speakers here were not corporations,
no one would suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech. It is
the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy . . . .”489
He then added this footnote: “It has been settled for almost a century that
corporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,”
citing Santa Clara.490 But the Court in Santa Clara did not decide that
question, much less “settle it.” Powell seemed unaware that Justice Harlan
later corrected the misconception caused by the clerk’s headnote.
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G. Campaign Finance
In Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the Supreme Court reviewed legislation passed
by Congress in 1974 to regulate the funding of federal elections.491 As
explained by Judge J. Skelly Wright, the statute responded to political abuses
that “culminated in the 1972 presidential campaign and its aftermath,
commonly called Watergate. Congress found that those excesses were fueled
by money collected for political purposes.”492 To Judge Harold Leventhal,
who served on the D.C. Circuit that upheld the 1974 legislation, the central
question was not whether money is speech but “the need to maintain
confidence in self-government, and to prevent the erosion of democracy which
comes from a popular view of government as responsive only or mainly to
special interests.”493
In Buckley, the Court upheld a congressional limit on personal
contributions to political campaigns but struck down a limit on expenditures.494
The Court accepted the legislative argument that contributions resemble quid
pro quos and may invite political corruption. It then reasoned that limits on
campaign expenditures “necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and
the size of the audience reached.”495
The ruling is difficult to analyze because it was issued as a per curiam for
which no Justice took responsibility. As noted by Ruth Bader Ginsburg when
she served on the D.C. Circuit, judges generally do not labor over per curiam
opinions “with the same intensity they devote to signed opinions.”496 Per
curiams are usually brief. The one in Buckley runs to 138 pages, followed by
60 pages of remarks by five Justices.497 They concurred with some parts while
dissenting from others.498 Justice Stevens did not participate.499
Chief Justice Burger objected that the per curiam, by dissecting the
congressional statute “bit by bit, casting off vital parts,” left a remainder he
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doubted was “workable.”500 He challenged the effort to distinguish between
contributions and expenditures, upholding one but not the other.501 To him,
contributions and expenditures “are two sides of the same First Amendment
coin” and the per curiam’s analysis “will not wash.”502 The statute “as it now
stands is unworkable and inequitable.”503 Justices White and Blackmun
rejected the Court’s distinction between contributions and expenditures.504
Justices Marshall and Rehnquist dissented in part.505
Conservative and liberal Justices have been highly critical of Buckley. A
1978 decision struck down a Massachusetts statute that prohibited
corporations from making contributions or expenditures to referenda and
elections.506 The Supreme Court split 5-4.507 A dissent by White, joined by
Brennan and Marshall, rejected the reasoning of Buckley.508 White observed
that in the arena of campaign finance “the expertise of legislators is at its peak
and that of judges is at its very lowest.”509 Rehnquist’s dissent objected that
the Court should have deferred to the judgment of Massachusetts in protecting
the integrity of its elections.510 In 1981, the Court divided 5-4 in deciding how
to interpret and apply Buckley with regard to corporate and union contributions
to a political committee.511
The difficulty of finding judicial agreement on campaign finance cases is
evident by reading Court decisions from 1982 forward.512 Of special interest
is a decision in 2000 that produced dissents from Justices Kennedy, Thomas,
and Scalia.513 Kennedy, who would write for the Court in Citizens United,
stated: “The plain fact is that the compromise the Court invented in Buckley
set the stage for a new kind of speech to enter the political system.” 514 He
meant that Buckley did not reflect thoughtful and informed constitutional
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analysis. Instead, it represented a compromise “invented” by the Court to yield
a type of speech that did not previously exist.
To Kennedy, there were sufficient grounds “to reject Buckley’s wooden
formula.”515 He warned that the “melancholy history of campaign finance in
Buckley’s wake shows what can happen when we intervene in the dynamics of
speech and expression by inventing an artificial scheme of our own.” 516
Stating that “Buckley has not worked,”517 he added: “I would overrule Buckley
and then free Congress or state legislatures to attempt some new reform, if,
based upon their own considered view of the First Amendment, it is possible
to do so.”518 Yet in deciding Citizens United ten years later, Kennedy relied
extensively on Buckley.519 In the 2000 case, a dissent by Thomas, joined by
Scalia, referred to “the analytic fallacies of our flawed decision in Buckley v.
Valeo” and said, “our decision in Buckley was in error, and I would overrule
it.”520 In 2001, the Court divided 5-4 over campaign finance.521
A campaign finance decision in 2003 stretched for 272 pages, with seven
Justices dissenting in part: Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, Rehnquist, Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer.522 Despite chronic problems with Buckley, a plurality
of the Court in 2006 relied on it to prevent Vermont from imposing limits on
campaign expenditures.523 Thomas and Scalia rejected the plurality’s
approach, pointing to “the continuing inability of the Court (and the plurality
here) to apply Buckley in a coherent and principled fashion.”524 To Stevens,
dissenting, “Buckley’s holding on expenditure limits is wrong” and “the time
has come to overrule it.”525
A 2007 case found the Court once again divided 5-4, this time in holding
unconstitutional a federal statute (the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, or
BCRA) that made it a crime for any corporation to broadcast shortly before an
election any communication that names a federal candidate for elected office
and that is targeted for the electorate.526 The Court’s lineup was significant:
five conservatives in the majority (Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito)
arrayed against four liberals (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer)—the same
configuration that decided Citizens United three years later.
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The Supreme Court often invalidates congressional legislation when it
decides that Congress has provided inadequate justification.527 What about
inadequate justification by the Court? In writing for the Court in Citizens
United, Justice Kennedy made this claim: “[W]e now conclude that
independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give
rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”528 Based on actual data,
experience, and findings, Congress and a number of states have determined
that corporate spending in political campaigns not only provides the
appearance of corruption but results in actual corruption.529 The Court
provided zero evidence to counter elected branch judgments.
Another Kennedy statement lacks corroborating evidence: “The
appearance of [corporate] influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the
electorate to lose faith in our democracy.”530 Courts need to anchor their
decisions on reliable evidence and convincing reasoning. Mere assertions are
hollow, especially when Congress and state legislatures have reached different
conclusions.
In 2012, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to learn something about
the link between corporate expenditures and campaign corruption. Montana
experienced a century of “copper kings” and other mining interests largely able
to control the state’s politics through financial power.531 It enacted legislation
to prohibit a corporation from making “an expenditure in connection with a
candidate or a political party.”532 The Supreme Court could have taken the
case, ordered briefs and oral argument, and had some of its beliefs and
assertions tested by actual evidence and experience. Instead, it issued a short
per curiam reversing the Supreme Court of Montana.533 A dissent signed by
four Justices (Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) stated that Citizens
United “should not bar the Montana Supreme Court’s finding, made on the
record before it, that independent expenditures by corporations did in fact lead
to corruption or the appearance of corruption in Montana.”534
Critics of Citizens United offer two means of relief: the Court could
confess error and reverse itself, or Congress and the states could pass and ratify
a constitutional amendment to empower legislative action to regulate
527
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campaign expenditures. There is a third and more practical option. In the field
of campaign finance, the Court stands on shaky ground by relying on strained
and artificial judicial creations and inventions: corporations are persons,
money is speech, and the First Amendment protects unlimited corporate
expenditures in political campaigns. Congress should hold hearings, invite
expert testimony on the influence of money on the electoral process, and
produce legislation that is coherent, principled, and evidence-based to protect
popular control and self-government.535
Such a bill, if enacted, would be litigated and the Supreme Court could
declare the statute contrary to its rulings. However, it would be institutionally
risky to strike down the statute merely because it conflicts with evidence-free
judicial decisions. Instead, the Court could announce: “Congress has
assembled evidence that was not available to us when we decided Buckley and
Citizens United. We now, after due consideration, defer to the legislative
judgment and override those two decisions.” If that were to happen, the Court
would be under appropriate pressure to adopt a more deferential attitude
toward state efforts to control campaign expenditures.
Would it be difficult for the Supreme Court to confess error? It has done
so in the past, as with child-labor legislation. In a dissenting opinion in 1932,
Justice Brandeis noted that the Supreme Court “bows to the lessons of
experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of
trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the
judicial function.”536 The Court is judged on the basis of the quality of its
decisions, its respect for the elected branches, and how it values selfgovernment, not on some abstract theory of finality that depends on judicial
creations and inventions. An essential test of credibility for all three branches
is the capacity to admit error and make corrections.
VII. CONCLUSION
For more than two centuries, the authority of the Supreme Court to
interpret the Constitution has encountered various limits. Still, the claim of
judicial finality continues to be pressed by courts and legal scholars. In City
of Boerne v. Flores in 1997, Justice Kennedy offered this perspective: “Our
national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best when each
part of the Government respects both the Constitution and the proper actions
and determinations of the other branches.”537 He then added: “When the Court
has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of the Judicial
Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is. Marbury v. Madison,
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1 Cranch, at 177.”538 The reference to Marbury lacks substance. Obviously it
is also the duty of Congress “to say what the law is.” Marbury offers no
support for judicial supremacy or judicial finality.539
Boerne claimed that when a statute collides with a Supreme Court ruling,
the ruling “must control.”540 Nothing in the record from 1789 to the present
time supports the view that when the Supreme Court decides a constitutional
issue, its ruling is binding and final on the elected branches. Court rulings
have been more fluid than fixed. Justice Kennedy took no note of Goldman v.
Weinberger (1986), which considered Captain Goldman’s request that he be
allowed to wear his yarmulke indoors while on duty.541 The case balanced his
constitutional right of religious liberty against the position of the Air Force
that it requires uniformity and discipline. Divided 5 to 4, the Court deferred
to the military.542 Within one year, lawmakers passed legislation to permit
members of the military to wear religious apparel unless it interferes with
military duties.543 Congress had full authority to override the Court’s
constitutional decision and extend greater protection to religious liberty in the
military services. It did so by exercising its Article I power to “make Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”544
It is not useful, helpful, or credible for the Court to insist that when it
decides a constitutional case the issue is closed unless the Court reverses a
decision or its ruling is overturned by constitutional amendment. All three
branches make mistakes. All three branches have the capacity to correct them.
Some judicial errors, however, persist decade after decade, no matter how
many scholars identify the deficiencies. A judicial ruling is not binding for all
time simply because it has been issued. It is controlling if sound in substance,
offers persuasive reasoning, and is accepted by the elected branches and the
public.
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